Optimal majority threshold in a stochastic environment by Malyshev, Vitaly
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Optimal majority threshold in a stochastic
environment
Vitaly Malyshev
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract Within the model of social dynamics determined by collective de-
cisions in a stochastic environment (the ViSE model), we consider the case
of a homogeneous society consisting of classically rational economic agents.
We obtain analytical expressions for the optimal majority threshold as a func-
tion of the parameters of the environment, assuming that the proposals are
generated by means of a continuous distribution. The cases of several specific
distributions are considered in more detail.
Keywords ViSE model · social dynamics · voting · stochastic environment ·
pit of losses
1 Introduction
In Borzenko et al (2006), the ViSE (Voting in a Stochastic Environment) model
has been proposed. Its simplest version describes a society that consists of n
classically rational economic agents, who are boundedly rational egoists (here-
after, egoists). Each of them maximizes their individual utility in every act
of choice, which turns out to be the most profitable noncooperative strategy.
Various cooperative and egoistic strategies within the ViSE model have been
studied in Borzenko et al (2006), Chebotarev (2006), Chebotarev et al (2009),
and Malyshev and Chebotarev (2017), altruistic strategies in Chebotarev et al
(2018b).
Each participant (agent) is characterized by the current value of capital
(which can also be interpreted as the value of individual utility). A proposal [of
the environment] is a vector of proposed capital increments of the participants.
A similar model with randomly generated proposals appeared in Compte and
Jehiel (2017). The society can accept or reject every proposal by voting. Each
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agent votes for those and only those proposals that increase their individual
capital. A proposal is accepted and implemented (i.e., the participants’ capi-
tals get the proposed increments) if and only if the proportion of the society
supporting this proposal is greater than α ∈ [0, 1] (the strict relative voting
threshold). Otherwise, all capitals remain unchanged. This voting procedure
is called “α-majority” (cf. Nitzan and Paroush (1982, 1984), Felsenthal and
Machover (2001) and O’Boyle (2009)).
The voting threshold α will also be called the majority threshold and,
more precisely, the acceptance threshold, since α < 0.5 is allowed.
The concept of proposal enables one to model potential changes that are
beneficial for some agents and disadvantageous for the others. As a result of
the implementation of such a proposal, the capitals of some agents increase,
while the capitals of the others decrease.
The proposals are stochastically generated by the environment and put to
a general vote over and over again. The subject of the study is the dynamics of
the participants’ capitals as a result of this process. A similar dynamic model
has been considered in Mirkin (1979), Subsection 1.3 of Chapter 2.
Further, dynamic voting models have been studied in the theory of legisla-
tive bargaining (see Duggan and Kalandrakis (2012)), where stochastic gener-
ation of proposals has been assumed in some cases (Penn (2009), Dziuda and
Loeper (2014, 2016)). On other connections between the ViSE model and var-
ious comparable models, we refer to Chebotarev et al (2018b). In accordance
with the basic ViSE model, the capital increments that form the proposals are
realizations of independent identically distributed random variables. In this
paper, we present a general result applicable to any distribution that has a
mean and focus on three families of distributions: continuous uniform distri-
butions, normal distributions (cf. Chebotarev et al (2018a)), and symmetrized
Pareto distributions (see Chebotarev et al (2018b)).
Each distribution is characterized by its mathematical expectation, µ and
standard deviation, σ. The ratio σ/µ is called the coefficient of variation of a
random variable. The inverse coefficient of variation ρ = µ/σ, which we call
the adjusted or normalized mean of the environment, measures the relative
favorability of the environment. If ρ > 0, then the opportunities provided by
the environment are favorable on average; if ρ < 0, then the environment is
unfavorable.
In the present paper, we study:
– the optimal acceptance threshold for a general continuous distribution
(Subsection 2.1), i.e., the threshold that maximizes the total capital of
the society (this generalizes Theorem 1 in Chebotarev et al (2018a));
– dependence of the optimal acceptance threshold on the model parameters
for several specific distributions (Subsections 2.2–2.4).
Optimal majority threshold in a stochastic environment 3
2 Optimal majority threshold
2.1 A general result
To familiarize with the problem that the optimal majority threshold solves,
let us look at the dependence of the one-step mean capital increment of an
agent on the adjusted mean of the environment ρ (Chebotarev et al (2018a)).
Let ζ = (ζ1, . . . , ζn) denote a random proposal on some step. Its compo-
nent ζi is the proposed capital increment of agent i. The components ζ1, . . . , ζn
are independent identically distributed random variables. ζ will denote a sim-
ilar scalar variable without reference to a specific agent. Similarly, let η =
(η1, . . . , ηn) be the random vector of actual increments of the agents on the
same step. If ζ is adopted, then η = ζ; otherwise η = (0, . . . , 0). Consequently,
η = ζI(ζ, αn), (1)
where
I(ζ, αn) =
{
1, if the number of positive components of ζ is greater than αn;
0, otherwise.
Let η be a random variable similar to every ηi, but having no reference to
a specific agent. We are interested in the one-step mean capital increment of
an agent, i.e. M(η), where M(·) is the mathematical expectation.
For 21 participants and α = 0.5, the dependence of M(η) on ρ = µ/σ is
presented in Fig. 1, where proposals are generated by the normal distribution.
Fig. 1 shows that for ρ ∈ (−0.85,−0.266), the mean capital increment is
an appreciable negative value, i.e., proposals approved by the majority are, on
average, unprofitable and impoverishing for the society. This part of the curve
is called a “pit of losses.” For ρ < −0.85, the negative mean increment is very
close to zero, since the proposals are extremely rarely accepted.
For each specific environment, there is an optimal acceptance threshold1
α0 that provides the highest possible one-step mean capital increment M(η)
of an agent.
The optimal acceptance threshold for the normal distribution as a function
of the environment parameters has been studied in Chebotarev et al (2018a).
This threshold turns out to be independent of the size of the society n.
Voting with the optimal acceptance thresholds always yields positive ex-
pected capital increments and so it is devoid of “pits of losses.”
The following theorem provides a general expression for the optimal voting
threshold, which holds for any distribution that has a mathematical expecta-
tion.
1 See Nitzan and Paroush (1982) and Azrieli and Kim (2014) on other approaches to
optimizing the majority threshold and Rae (1969) and Sekiguchi and Ohtsuki (2015) for a
discussion of the case of multiple voting in this context.
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Fig. 1 One-step mean capital increment of an agent: 21 agents; α = 0.5; normal distribu-
tion.
Theorem 1 In a society consisting of egoists, the optimal voting threshold is
α0 =
(
1 +
M+
M−
)−1
, (2)
where M− =
∣∣M(ζ | ζ ≤ 0)∣∣,M+ = M(ζ | ζ > 0), and random variable ζ
determines the capital increment of any agent in a random proposal.
In terms of the value R = M
+
M− , which we call the win/loss magnitude
ratio, equation (2) takes the form
α0 = (1 +R)
−1
.
Proof According to the proof of Lemma 1 in Chebotarev (2006), we have
M(η) =
n∑
x=[nt]+1
M(η | n+ = x) b(x | n), (3)
where η is the actual one-step capital increment of an agent determined by
(1), n+ is the number of positive components in a proposal, nt = αn is the
absolute voting threshold (a proposal is accepted if and only if n+ > nt),
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[nt] is the integer part of nt, b(x | n) = P{n+ = x} =
(
n
x
)
pxqn−x, p is the
probability that a proposal component is positive, and q = 1− p.
Let us ascertain how M(η) changes as α increases. When a continuously
increasing nt = αn becomes integer, we remove one term from the sum (3).
Now we take into account that:
(i) b(x | n) is always positive;
(ii) when M(η | n+ = [nt] + 1) changes its sign from minus to plus with
the increase of nt = αn, i.e., when the sum (3) collects exactly all the positive
terms, we get the maximum M(η), i.e., the maximum one-step mean capital
increment. In turn, this determines an optimal absolute voting threshold n0 =
nt and the corresponding optimal relative voting threshold α0 such that α0n =
n0.
If a threshold α is optimal and [α1n] = [αn], then α1 is also an optimal
threshold. As follows from the above considerations, all the optimal majority
thresholds α0 can be found from the system of inequalities
{
M(η | n+ = [α0n]) < 0
M(η | n+ = [α0n] + 1) > 0.
(4)
Observe that for any integer x in the segment
[
[nt] + 1, n − 1
]
, it holds
that2
M(η | n+ = x) = M(η | n+ = x, η > 0)P{η > 0 | n+ = x} (5)
+M(η | n+ = x, η ≤ 0)P{η ≤ 0 | n+ = x},
P{η > 0 | n+ = x} = x
n
, (6)
and
P{η ≤ 0 | n+ = x} = 1− x
n
. (7)
Substituting (5)–(7) into (4) and using the fact that by the independence
of the components of the proposal, M(η | n+ = x, η > 0) = M(η | η > 0) =
M(ζ | ζ > 0) = M+ and similarly ∣∣M(η | n+ = x, η ≤ 0)∣∣ = ∣∣M(η | n+ >
nt, η ≤ 0)
∣∣ = ∣∣M(ζ | ζ ≤ 0)∣∣ = M−, we obtain
M
+ [α0n]
n −M−
(
1− [α0n]n
)
< 0
M+ [α0n]+1n −M−
(
1− [α0n]+1n
)
> 0.
(8)
Expressing α0 from this we get one of the optimal majority thresholds:
2 In the case of x = n, there is only the first term of the following equation.
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α0 =
(
1 +
M+
M−
)−1
.
Finally, observe that the left-hand side of the first inequality of (8) with α
substituted for α0 grows in α ∈ [0; 1] because M+ ≥ 0 and M− ≥ 0. Therefore
M(η | n+ = x) indeed changes its sign from minus to plus as x grows. uunionsq
Let α¯0 be the center of the half-interval of optimal majority thresholds
for fixed n, σ, and µ. Then this half-interval is [α¯0 − 12n , α¯0 + 12n [ and its
extreme points have denominator n. Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the dependence
of α¯0 on ρ = µ/σ for different distributions that characterize the stochastic
environment by determining generation of proposals.
As one can observe for different distributions, outside the segment ρ ∈
[−0.7, 0.7], if a majority threshold is close to the optimal one and the number
of participants is appreciable, then the proposals are almost always accepted
(to the right of the segment) or almost always rejected (to the left of this seg-
ment). Therefore, in these cases, the issue of determining the accurate optimal
threshold loses its practical value.
2.2 Proposals generated by continuous uniform distributions
Let −a < 0 and b > 0 be the minimum and maximum values of a continuous
uniform distribution, respectively.
Corollary 1 The optimal majority threshold in the case of proposals generated
by the continuous uniform distribution on the segment [−a, b] with −a < 0 and
b > 0 is
α0 =
(
1 +
b
a
)−1
. (9)
Indeed, in this case, M− = a2 ,M
+ = b2 , and R =
b
a , hence, (2) provides
(9).
If b approaches 0 from above, then α0 approaches 1 from below, and the
optimal voting procedure is unanimity. Indeed, profitable proposed capital
increments become much smaller in absolute value than disadvantageous ones,
therefore, each participant should be able to reject a proposal.
As −a approaches 0 from below, disadvantageous proposed capital incre-
ments become much smaller in absolute value than profitable ones. Therefore,
a coalition consisting of any single voter should be able to accept a proposal.
In accordance with this, the optimal relative threshold α0 decreases to 0.
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Fig. 2 The center a¯0 of the half-interval of optimal majority thresholds (a “ladder”) for
n = 21 and the optimal majority threshold (9) as functions of ρ for continuous uniform
distributions.
Corollary 2 In terms of the adjusted mean of the environment ρ = µ/σ, it
holds that
α0 =

1, ρ ≤ −√3
1
2
(
1− ρ√
3
)
, −√3 < ρ < √3
0, ρ ≥ √3.
This follows from (9) and the expressions µ = −a+b2 and σ =
b+a
2
√
3
. It is worth
mentioning that the dependence of α0 on ρ is linear, as distinct from (9).
Figure 2 illustrates the dependence of the center of the half-interval of op-
timal majority thresholds versus ρ = µ/σ for continuous uniform distributions
in the segment ρ ∈ [−0.5, 0.5].
2.3 Proposals generated by normal distributions
For normal distributions, the following corollary holds.
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Fig. 3 The center a¯0 of the half-interval of optimal majority thresholds (a “ladder”) for
n = 21 and the optimal majority threshold (10) as functions of ρ for normal distributions.
Corollary 3 The optimal majority threshold in the case of proposals generated
by the normal distribution with parameters µ and σ is
α0 = F (ρ)
(
1− ρF (−ρ)
f(ρ)
)
, (10)
where ρ = µ/σ, while F (·) and f(·) are the standard normal cumulative
distribution function and density, respectively.
Corollary 3 follows from Theorem 1 and the facts thatM− = −σ
(
ρ− f(ρ)F (−ρ)
)
,
and M+ = σ
(
ρ+ f(ρ)F (ρ)
)
, which can be easily found by integration. Note that
Corollary 3 strengthens the first statement of Theorem 1 in Chebotarev et al
(2018a).
Figure 3 illustrates the dependence of the center of the half-interval of
optimal majority thresholds versus ρ = µ/σ for normal distributions in the
segment ρ ∈ [−2.5, 2.5] (to show nonlinearity).
We refer to Chebotarev et al (2018a) for some additional properties (e.g.,
the rate of change of the optimal voting threshold as a function of ρ).
2.4 Proposals generated by symmetrized Pareto distributions
Pareto distributions are widely used for modeling social, linguistic, geophys-
ical, financial, and some other types of data. The Pareto distribution with
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Fig. 4 The center a¯0 of the half-interval of optimal majority thresholds (a “ladder”) for
n = 131 and the optimal majority threshold (11) as functions of ρ for symmetrized Pareto
distributions with k = 8.
positive parameters k and a can be defined by means of the function P (ξ >
x) =
(
a
x
)k
, where ξ ∈ [a,∞) is a random variable.
The ViSE model normally involves distributions that enable both positive
and negative values. Consider the symmetrized Pareto distributions (see
Chebotarev et al (2018b) for more details). For its construction, the density
function f(x) = kx
(
a
x
)k
of the Pareto distribution is divided by 2 and combined
with its reflection w.r.t. the line x = a.
The density of the resulting distribution with mode µ is
f(x) =
k
2a
( |x− µ|
a
+ 1
)−(k+1)
.
For symmetrized Pareto distributions with k > 2, the following result holds
true.
Corollary 4 The optimal majority threshold in the case of proposals generated
by the symmetrized Pareto distribution with parameters µ, σ, and k > 2 is
α0 =

C+ρ
kρ+C
(
1− 12
(
C
C+ρ
)k)
, µ > 0,
1 + C−ρkρ−C
(
1− 12
(
C
C−ρ
)k)
, µ ≤ 0,
(11)
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where ρ = µσ , and C =
√
(k−1)(k−2)
2 =
a
σ .
Corollary 4 follows from Theorem 1 and the facts (their proof is given
below) that:
M− = σ
(
C+ρ
k−1
)
, M+ = σ
1− 12 ( CC+ρ )
k
(
ρ+
(
C
C+ρ
)k
C+ρ
2(k−1)
)
whenever µ >
0;
M− = − σ
1− 12 ( CC−ρ )
k
(
ρ−
(
C
C−ρ
)k
C−ρ
2(k−1)
)
, M+ = σ
(
C−ρ
k−1
)
whenever
µ ≤ 0.
The “ladder” and the optimal majority threshold curve for symmetrized
Pareto distributions are fundamentally different from the corresponding curves
for the normal and continuous uniform distributions. Namely, we have α¯0 = 0.5
in a rather wide neighborhood of ρ = 0 for odd n’s and an increase of α0 when
ρ becomes positive for even n’s.
Correspondingly, the curve α0(ρ) has an abnormal part in a vicinity of
zero, where the optimal threshold increases with the adjusted mean. As a
result, the optimal relative threshold α0(ρ) has two extremes. This is caused
by the peculiarities of the symmetrized Pareto distribution. An increase of ρ
through zero decreases M+ and increases M−. By virtue of Eq. (2), this causes
an increase of α0.
Figure 4 illustrates the dependence of the center of the half-interval of
optimal voting thresholds versus ρ = µ/σ for symmetrized Pareto distributions
with k = 8.
Proof of Corollary 4 Let F (·) and f(·) be the cumulative Pareto distri-
bution function and the Pareto density, respectively; ρ = µ/σ, and Cσ =
σ
√
(k−1)(k−2)
2 = a.
Let µ > 0. Then
M− = − 1
F (0)
∫ 0
−∞
x
k
2Cσ
(−x+ Cσ + ρσ
Cσ
)−(k+1)
dx
= − 1
1
2
(
C
C+ρ
)k k2Cσ
(
(Cσ)k+1(−x+ Cσ + ρσ)−k(kx− Cσ − ρσ)
(k − 1)k
) ∣∣∣∣0
−∞
= σ
(
C + ρ
k − 1
)
;
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M+ =
1
1− F (0)
∫ µ
0
x
k
2Cσ
(−x+ Cσ + ρσ
Cσ
)−(k+1)
dx
+
1
1− F (0)
∫ ∞
µ
x
k
2Cσ
(
x+ Cσ − ρσ
Cσ
)−(k+1)
dx
=
1
1− 12
(
C
C+ρ
)k k2Cσ
(
(Cσ)k+1(−x+ Cσ + ρσ)−k(kx− Cσ − ρσ)
(k − 1)k
) ∣∣∣∣ρσ
0
− 1
1− 12
(
C
C+ρ
)k k2Cσ
(
(Cσ)k+1(x+ Cσ − ρσ)−k(kx+ Cσ − ρσ)
(k − 1)k
) ∣∣∣∣∞
ρσ
=
σ
1− 12
(
C
C+ρ
)k
(
ρ+
(
C
C + ρ
)k
C + ρ
2(k − 1)
)
.
Similarly,M− = − σ
1− 12 ( CC−ρ )
k
(
ρ−
(
C
C−ρ
)k
C−ρ
2(k−1)
)
andM+ = σ
(
C−ρ
k−1
)
whenever µ ≤ 0. uunionsq
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we obtained a general expression for the optimal voting threshold
(i.e., the threshold that maximizes the total capital of the society) as a function
of the parameters of the stochastic proposal generator in the assumptions of
the ViSE model. This expression was given a more specific form for several
types of distributions.
Estimation of the optimal majority threshold seems to be a solvable prob-
lem in real situations. If the ViSE model is at least approximately adequate
and one can estimate ρ = µ/σ using experiments, then it is possible to obtain
such an estimation by means of the formulas provided in this study.
We found that for some distributions of proposals, the plausible at first
glance conclusion that it is beneficial to increase the voting threshold when
the environment becomes less favorable is not generally true. A more in-depth
study of this issue should be the subject of future research.
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